Notions of Fairness And Contingent Fees by Zamir, Eyal & Ritov, Ilana
ZAMIR & RITOV 3/8/2011  
 






Notions of fairness occupy a prominent position in the law generally, and in 
assessing the validity of transactions and the need for their regulation, in 
particular. Fairness judgments can refer to various aspects of a transaction, yet 
their primary object is the adequacy of remuneration: does each party receive 
fair value in return for what she gives? One type of transaction whose fairness 
has been extensively and hotly debated is the hiring of attorneys on a 
contingent fee (CF) basis by plaintiffs in tort and other actions. This article 
reports and analyzes findings of several experiments designed to ascertain what 
factors determine people’s judgments of the fairness of CF arrangements, how 
these judgments affect the market for attorneys’ services, and what broader 
implications can be drawn from these judgments. Assessing the fairness of 
transactions obviously entails normative judgments, and we shall indeed discuss 
normative issues involved in these judgments. However, our primary focus is 
not normative. Rather, the article strives to elucidate the way people form 
fairness judgments regarding CF arrangements and possible mechanisms 
through which these judgments affect the market. 
CF arrangements are the standard method of financing civil litigation in 
various types of suits, including personal injuries. Under such arrangements, an 
attorney’s fee is contingent upon the success of the claim, calculated as a certain 
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percentage of the amount recovered, and paid upon recovery.1 In the United 
States, the conventional flat CF rate is 33% of the recovery. When the rate 
depends on the stage at which the case ends, it is usually 25% if the case does 
not go to trial, rising to as high as 50% if the case reaches an appellate court.2 
Many statutes in the United States and elsewhere regulate CF arrangements by 
setting caps on CF rates for specific types of suits, such as medical malpractice 
and road accidents.3 In addition, courts, and sometimes the bar, are authorized 
to judicially or quasi-judicially review the reasonableness of fees on a case-by-
case basis.4 
Advocates of CF point out that CF arrangements enable plaintiffs of limited 
financial means to secure otherwise unaffordable legal services. These CF 
arrangements increase access to the courts, thereby empowering the 
underprivileged and forcing injurers to internalize the costs of their activities.5 
Essentially, CF arrangements provide clients with credit (since the fee is only 
paid upon recovery) and with a sort of insurance (since the fee is not paid if the 
claim fails).6 CF arrangements induce attorneys not to take cases whose 
expected value is too small, thus saving their clients, and the court system, the 
costs involved in pursuing such claims. A CF arrangement also incentivizes the 
 
 1. See Eyal Zamir & Ilana Ritov, Revisiting the Debate over Attorneys’ Contingent Fees: A 
Behavioral Analysis, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 245–46 (2010). 
 2. Herbert M. Kritzer, Seven Dogged Myths Concerning Contingency Fees, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 
757–61 (2002). According to Kritzer, about two-thirds of the cases, excluding those governed by special 
regulation, involve a fixed percentage (flat fee), and about one-third involve a variable percentage. In 
88% of flat fee cases, the CF is 33% of the recovery. The common pattern in the cases employing a 
variable percentage is to charge 25% of the recovery if the case does not go to trial or does not involve 
substantial trial preparations; 33% if the case goes beyond that point, and 40% to 50% if the case 
results in an appeal. See Zamir & Ritov, supra note 1, at 245–46. 
 3. See GABRIEL KLING, ETHICS FOR LAWYERS 243–58 (2001); Casey L. Dwyer, An Empirical 
Examination of the Equal Protection Challenge to Contingency Fee Restrictions in Medical Malpractice 
Reform Statutes, 56 DUKE L.J. 611, 614–17 (2006) (discussing caps on contingent fees in several states as 
well as congressional attempts to place limits on contingency fees in medical malpractice suits); Steven 
Garber et al., Do Noneconomic Damages Caps and Attorney Fee Limits Reduce Access to Justice for 
Victims of Medical Negligence?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 649–50 (2009) (providing 
information on contingent fee limits in various states). 
 4. ROBERT H. ARONSON, ATTORNEY-CLIENT FEE ARRANGEMENTS: REGULATION AND 
REVIEW 90–93 (1980) (discussing judicial review of CF rates); 1 ROBERT L. ROSSI, ATTORNEY’S FEES 
110–13 (2d ed. 1995) (same); Lester Brickman, Contingency Fee Abuses, Ethical Mandates, and the 
Disciplinary System: The Case Against Case-by-Case Enforcement, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1339 
(1996) (describing and criticizing the enforcement of the pertinent ethical norms); Ted Schneyer, Legal-
Process Constraints on the Regulation of Lawyers’ Contingent Fee Contracts, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 
396–97 (1998). 
 5. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 615 (7th ed. 2007) (arguing that, 
although a CF arrangement makes it easier for illiquid or risk-averse people to bring suits, it does not 
necessarily produce more litigation, because “the likelier a suit is to be brought if there is violation of 
law that causes injury, the greater is the deterrent effect . . . and hence the less likely are potential 
defendants to engage in the forbidden conduct”); Neil Rickman, The Economics of Contingency Fees in 
Personal Injury Litigation, 10 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 34, 39, 47 (1994) (pointing to the 
distributional and deterrence advantages of enhancing access to justice through CF). 
 6. Richard W. Painter, Litigating on a Contingency: A Monopoly of Champions or a Market for 
Champerty?, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 625, 653–55 (1995). See also Zamir & Ritov, supra note 1, at 246. 
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attorney to win the case or attain a favorable settlement, and at the same time 
to avoid investing too much time in handling it.7 Given these additional benefits 
to the client, it is argued that the effective hourly rate (EHR) resulting from the 
prevailing CF ratesthe expected fee divided by the number of hours the 
lawyer works on the caseis very reasonable compared to prevailing hourly 
rates.8 
Critics of current CF practices portray a very different picture. They argue 
that the insurance element of CF is illusory, for there is typically no real risk 
involved in the cases attorneys take on a CF basis.9 Similarly, the credit element 
should not add much to the fee because the attorney enjoys an excellent 
collection method: she deducts her fee from the award before forwarding it to 
her client.10 Current CF rates, so it is charged, reflect various market failures, 
including plaintiffs’ inability to assess the value and prospects of their case and 
the scope of work involved in handling it, lawyers’ uniform pricing practices, the 
absence of price advertisements, clients’ prohibitive search costs, and the 
prohibitions against the purchase of tort claims and against brokerage of 
lawyers’ services.11 Consequently, CF arrangements often result in effective 
rates that are several times higher than ordinary hourly rates.12 
 
 7. Standard CF arrangements do not perfectly align an attorney’s interests with those of her 
client, as it induces the attorney to accept settlement offers that are not necessarily in the client’s best 
interest; yet, the higher the lawyer’s share of the recovery (through the CF rate), the more their 
interests converge. The client’s expected gain from strengthening the lawyer’s motivation may outweigh 
the expected loss from the larger share paid to the lawyer. On the various incentive effects of CF 
arrangements, see, e.g., Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the 
Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1125 (1970). See also Zamir & Ritov, 
supra note 1, at 246, 252; Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving the Contingent Fee, 63 
CORNELL L. REV. 529, 534–46 (1978); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Contingency Fees, 
Settlement Delay, and Low-Quality Litigation: Empirical Evidence from Two Datasets, 19 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 517 (2003); Michael McKee, Rudy Santore & Joel Shelton, Contingent Fees, Moral Hazard, and 
Attorney Rents: A Laboratory Experiment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 253 (2007); Geoffrey P. Miller, Some 
Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 189 (1987); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Aligning the Interests of Lawyers and Clients, 5 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 165 (2003); Terry 
Thomason, Are Attorneys Paid What They’re Worth? Contingent Fees and the Settlement Process, 20 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 187 (1991). 
 8. See HERBERT M. KRITZER, THE JUSTICE BROKER 137–43 (1990) [hereinafter THE JUSTICE 
BROKER] (arguing, on the basis of a large-scale empirical research study conducted in 1979–1980, that 
“in an overall sense, contingent fee lawyers do not do better than they would do charging on an hourly 
fee basis, at least in ordinary litigation”); HERBERT M. KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND 
REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE LEGAL PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, 180–218 (2004) 
[hereinafter RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS] (comparing the median hourly earnings of hourly 
fee lawyers and effective hourly earnings of contingent fee lawyers); Zamir & Ritov, supra note 1, at 
246. 
 9. Lester Brickman, Contingency Fees Without Contingencies: Hamlet Without the Prince of 
Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29 (1989). See Zamir & Ritov, supra note 1, at 246. 
 10. Brickman, supra note 9, at 118–19 (arguing that the credit component of CF arrangements 
contains no element of risk, and thus, a reasonable rate would be the statutory rate for prejudgment 
interest). See also Zamir & Ritov, supra note 1, at 246. 
 11. Lester Brickman, The Market for Contingent Fee-Financed Tort Litigation: Is It Price 
Competitive?, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 65 (2003); Painter, supra note 6, at 653–68 (discussing additional 
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In a previous article, we presented a series of experiments designed to 
reveal people’s preferences regarding attorneys’ fees.13 Contrary to common 
economic wisdom, these experiments demonstrated that loss aversion (rather 
than risk aversion or incentivizing the lawyer to win the case) plays a major role 
in clients’ preferences for CF arrangements. Plaintiffs prefer a contingent fee 
over a fixed fee (FF) even if it yields an expected fee that is two or three times 
higher than a non-contingent one. These findings fall in line with the prevalent 
perception that the EHR under CF is significantly higher than under non-
contingent fee arrangements, and that this difference cannot be entirely 
attributed to the insurance and credit elements of CF arrangements.14 
The current article seeks to advance understanding of the market for 
attorneys’ services and its regulation from a different angle, namely the 
perceived fairness of CF arrangements. It reports a series of experiments 
designed to identify the factors bearing on the perceived (un)fairness of CF 
arrangements and discusses their practical implications. Four primary factors 
determine the EHR resulting from a CF arrangement: the claimed sum, the 
probability of recovery, the CF rate, and the number of hours the attorney 
works on the case. Specifically, the EHR is the product of the first three 
factors—the claimed sum, the probability of recovery, and the CF rate—divided 
 
market imperfections allegedly characterizing the CF market, including the tie-in of different 
products—legal services, credit, and insurance—and price discrimination). 
 12. Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and 
Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 653 (2003) (arguing that the yields from CF practice have 
become inordinately high and that they are “often amounting today to thousands of dollars an hour”); 
Susan P. Koniak, Principled Opinions: Response to Brickman, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 337, 352 (1996) 
(suggesting that attorneys should be obliged to adjust standard CF rates downward whenever it turns 
out that securing the recovery required only minimal time and effort). 
 13. Zamir & Ritov, supra note 1. 
 14. Brickman, supra note 11, at 69–74; Leonard E. Gross, Are Differences Among the Attorney 
Conflict of Interest Rules Consistent with Principles of Behavioral Economics?, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 111, 138 (2006) (“Personal injury lawyers realize that they can make much more money per 
hour by handling cases on a contingent fee basis.”); Koniak, supra note 12, at 352. See also Thomas B. 
Metzloff, Resolving Malpractice Disputes: Imagining the Jury’s Shadow, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
43, 100–01 (Winter 1991) (arguing that in damages-only cases, that is cases in which liability is not 
seriously disputed, “a contingency fee agreement awarding 33 percent or more of the total recovery 
would, in most instances, be grossly out of proportion to the effort required and the costs incurred”); 
Stephen D. Annand & Roberta F. Green, Legislative and Judicial Controls of Contingency Fees in Tort 
Cases, 99 W. VA. L. REV. 81, 87–88 (1996). Even Kritzer’s empirical study, while estimating that the 
median effective hourly fee resulting from CF arrangements in Wisconsin in the early 1990s ($132) was 
only marginally higher than ordinary hourly fees ($124), found that the mean effective hourly fee 
($242) was almost twice as large as the ordinary hourly fee. Kritzer, supra note 2, at 761–68. Based on 
this data and on data regarding federal cases, Kritzer points out that the large gap between the mean 
and median effective rates comes from the top ten percent of cases that produce the largest profits for 
CF lawyers. Excluding those ten percent, an attorney may expect a fee premium of twenty-five percent 
to thirty percent compared to what hourly rates generate. The premium is much higher once all cases 
are taken into account, including the most profitable ones. RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, 
supra note 8, at 218. See Zamir & Ritov, supra note 1, at 251. 
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by the number of hours worked.15 Mathematically, each of these factors equally 
affects the EHR. Therefore, a change in any of these factors should have a 
similar proportional effect on the perceived fairness of the CF arrangement. 
This is not, however, what our experiments show. According to our findings, 
high CF rates are considered unfair, even when they result in a rather low EHR, 
whereas low CF rates are deemed fair even if they result in a relatively high 
EHR. The effect of the CF rate on the perceived fairness is considerably and 
significantly higher than the effect of any of the other variables examined. This 
means that CF arrangements invoke notions of division fairness (the fairness of 
dividing a certain pie) much more than fairness of exchange (the equivalence 
between the attorney’s fee and the value of her services). At the same time, 
there was no direct correlation between people’s perceived fairness of different 
CF arrangements and their preferences when asked to choose between a 
contingent and a non-contingent fee. It is thus conjectured that the primary 
mechanisms through which the prevailing perceptions about the fairness of 
contingent fees affect the market are the behavior of attorneys who care about 
their reputation, and regulators who set caps for CF rates, rather than clients’ 
preferences. The resulting “fairness constraint” drives very high CF rates out of 
the market, even in cases in which the parties would have found them mutually 
beneficial. 
If very high CF rates are deemed unfair even when they result in a rather 
low EHR, then the rarity of such rates does not necessarily point to a market 
failure such as asymmetric information or imperfect competition. It may rather 
reflect a fairness constraint on pricing legal services. These findings also 
indicate that the tendency of legislators and courts to regulate CF arrangements 
by setting caps on high CF rates—while largely disregarding the probability of 
recovery, the amount of work the case is likely to require, and often the 
expected reward—does not necessarily or exclusively rest on the practical 
difficulty of assessing the latter three variables. It probably rests also, and to a 




rpSEHR   where EHR is the Effective Hourly Rate, r is the CF rate, p is the probability 
of recovery, S is the claimed sum, and h is the expected hours the attorney will work on the case. In 
fact, the fee’s expected value is determined by the distribution of the possible sums of recovery. In a 
discrete setting, the effective hourly rate is an aggregation of the products of each sum and the 








ii piwhereSp . In a continuance setting, the expected 
value of the sum of recovery is the integral over the probability density function. Similarly, the amount 
of work is typically uncertain ex ante, and thus the relevant factor is the expected value of hours. 
Assuming a discrete distribution, in which the likelihood that the amount of hours hi required to 








ii qiwherehq . In addition to 
the four primary factors, the attorney’s effective fee also depends on such secondary factors as the 
delay between doing her work and being paid for it. 
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The present article sheds light on the complex phenomenon of lawyers’ CF 
arrangements from one angle only. It does not purport to refute or undermine 
other explanations—economic, psychological, or sociological—for the 
prevailing rates. Although the experimental findings illuminate an important 
aspect of the CF practice, they do not yield direct normative or policy 
implications. Drawing such implications would require the consideration of 
numerous factors and arguments, including the importance of access to justice, 
market competitiveness, plaintiffs’ loss aversion, the parties’ incentives, and 
institutional competence of regulators. Those issues lie beyond the scope of the 
present article. 
Although CF arrangements and their perceived fairness have some unique 
features, the experimental findings have broader implications regarding the 
ways people form judgments of fairness and the mechanisms through which 
these judgments may affect market behavior and legal rulemaking. Any social 
context or transaction in which people make different contributions to a 
common undertaking and the output or revenues are then divided between 
them, shares characteristics of CF arrangements. These contexts range from 
relationships between spouses to commercial joint ventures.16 Some forms of 
contingent fees are also common in real estate brokerage, contracts between 
issuers of securities and underwriters, and the hiring of architects and 
engineers.17 Drawing broader conclusions from our experiments obviously 
requires paying close attention to the differences between the various contexts. 
The article proceeds as follows: part II first proposes a taxonomy of various 
notions of fairness that may be deemed relevant in evaluating CF arrangements. 
It then points out the ways in which such judgments may affect actual CF rates 
in the market. Part III describes a series of experiments. The first five 
experiments aim at determining which factors affect people’s judgments of the 
fairness of CF arrangements and to what extent. We examine directly how these 
judgments are affected by the size of the expected recovery, the probability of 
recovery, the CF rate, and the expected scope of work, and indirectly how they 
are affected by the lawyer’s EHR. The sixth experiment studies the correlation 
between the perceived fairness of CF arrangements and clients’ choices 
between contingent and fixed fees. Part IV discusses our findings and examines 
their implications for judicial and statutory supervision on CF rates, as well as 
for fairness judgments more generally. 
 
 16. On the former, see, e.g., Gerold Mikula, Division of Household Labor and Perceived Justice: A 
Growing Field of Research, 11 SOC. JUST. RES. 215 (1998) (discussing perceptions of fairness in the 
gender imbalance of household labor). 
 17. See generally Saul Levmore, Commissions and Conflicts in Agency Arrangements: Lawyers, 
Real Estate Brokers, Underwriters, and Other Agents’ Reward, 36 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1993) (discussing 
the similarities between fee arrangements of real estate brokers, lawyers, underwriters, and other 
services providers). See also Hsuan-Chi Chen & Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55 J. FIN. 
1105 (2000) (analyzing underwriters’ uniform commissions). 
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II 
NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND CONTINGENT FEES 
A.  Notions of Fairness: A Taxonomy 
Judgments of fairness are often multidimensional.18 Judging the fairness of 
CF arrangements is particularly complex. At least six different factors may be 
deemed relevant in forming such judgments: procedural, redistributive, output, 
pricing, and division fairness; as well as fairness of exchange. Although this 
article does not deal with all of these factors, it seems useful to mention them 
here so as to put the present article in perspective and to set the ground for 
future studies of fairness in comparable transactional settings. 
Procedural fairness refers to the fairness of the process by which a fee 
arrangement is determined. Is the fee arrangement negotiated between the 
parties or rather dictated by one of them? Is the arrangement clearly explained 
to the uninformed party prior to the agreement? Is she offered a choice 
between different fee arrangements? Procedural fairness (often called 
procedural justice) has long been studied by social psychologists in various 
contexts, including wages and other aspects of employment relationships.19 
Several studies have discussed the process of contracting for CF arrangements.20 
Another factor, redistributive fairness, has to do with the relative and 
absolute overall positions of the parties. Studies of the perceived fairness of 
wages, for instance, indicate that workers’ neediness may affect the perceived 
fairness of their wages.21 Similarly, one may conjecture that the relative and 
absolute wealth of an attorney and her client may bear on the assessed fairness 
of the fee. In fact, some discussions of the regulation of lawyers’ fees implicitly 
or explicitly refer to the socioeconomic characteristics of plaintiffs.22 
 
 18. Colin F. Camerer & Kenneth R. MacCrimmon, Underground and Overpaid: Equity Theory in 
Practice, in EQUITY THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 295 (David M. 
Messick & Karen S. Cook eds., 1983) (enriching the social psychology analysis of fairness judgments by 
incorporating a host of economic and decision theory factors). 
 19. See generally DISTRIBUTIVE AND PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (Kjell Törnblom & Riël Vermunt 
eds., 2007); THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE: SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES (Roger Folger ed., 
1984) (discussing procedural justice in the political and legal spheres); Robert Folger, Distributive and 
Procedural Justice: Combined Impact of “Voice” and Improvement on Experienced Inequity, 35 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 108 (1977) (discussing procedural fairness in the context of a wage 
experiment); Foard F. Jones, Vida Scarpello & Thomas Bergmann, Pay Procedures—What Makes 
Them Fair?, 72 OCCUPATIONAL & ORGANIZATIONAL PSYCHOL. 129 (1999) (discussing methods of 
assessing procedural fairness in the context of pay systems). 
 20. See JOHN W. TOOTHMAN & WILLIAM G. ROSS, LEGAL FEES: LAW AND MANAGEMENT 168–
76 (2003) (discussing formal and informational aspects of CF agreements); Brickman, supra note 9, at 
49–54 (discussing clients’ information problems and lawyers’ disclosure duties); Gross, supra note 14 
(analyzing conflicts of interests between lawyers and clients in the contracting process); THE JUSTICE 
BROKER, supra note 8, at 57–59 (describing the contracting process between lawyers and litigants). 
 21. Miriam Dornstein, The Fairness Judgment of Received Pay and Their Determinants, 62 J. 
OCCUPATIONAL PSYCHOL. 287, 289, 294 (1989). 
 22. Cf. Stephen Gillers, Caveat Client: How the Proposed Final Draft of the Restatement of Law 
Governing Lawyers Fails to Protect Unsophisticated Consumers in Fee Agreements with Lawyers, 10 
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Without denying their importance in transactional contexts and their 
relevance to the CF debate, the present article will not directly discuss 
procedural and redistributive notions of fairness. Rather, it will focus on the 
substantive fairness of the fee arrangement and sidestep redistributive issues. 
A third factor affecting the fairness of the fee arrangement is the outcome of 
the attorney’s work, or output fairness. The central characteristic of CF 
arrangements is that the fee is not calculated on the basis of the attorney’s 
input—time, effort, expertise, and reputation—but rather, on the output of her 
work—the amount recovered.23 Like contingent remunerations in other spheres, 
such as typical brokerage fees, CFs directly depend on the benefit the client 
derives from the attorney’s services. From this perspective, CF arrangements 
are ipso facto more responsive to the concern of output fairness than other 
arrangements. 
The fourth factor, pricing fairness, has to do with the relation of the present 
fee to the fees charged by other attorneys for similar cases or by the same 
attorney for other cases. A vast body of literature focuses on the fairness of 
prices, including wages and rents. These studies forcefully establish the 
importance of reference points in making such judgments. The reference point 
may be the price paid by other customers or the wage paid to other employees.24 
It may also be the price a firm ordinarily charges for a certain good or the wage 
it ordinarily pays. These would be the pertinent reference points when a firm 
considers raising prices or cutting salaries in response to sudden changes in the 
demand for its products or unemployment rates at a certain locality.25 There is 
no reason to assume that legal fees are in any way different from other prices in 
this respect. In fact, the manifest standardization and stability of CF rates are 
 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 581 (1997) (suggesting that the sophistication of the client will affect the 
reasonableness of the fee). 
 23. Rickman, supra note 5, at 36–37. 
 24. J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL 
PSYCHOLOGY 267, 280 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965) (positing that employees seek to maintain equity 
between the inputs that they bring to a job and the outcomes that they receive from it against the 
perceived inputs and outcomes of others); Jennifer C. Smith, Wage Interactions: Comparisons or Fall-
Back Options, 106 ECON. J. 495 (1996) (providing empirical evidence that wages paid elsewhere matter 
in pay bargaining because comparisons are important to workers, even if workers do not have a real 
“fall back” option); Dornstein, supra note 21 (describing empirical findings indicating that pay fairness 
evaluations are based, inter alia, on comparisons with similar as well as dissimilar others). The central 
role of comparisons to others is also manifest in the context of plea bargains. Avishalom Tor, Oren 
Gazal-Ayal & Stephen M. Garcia, Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 107–09 (2010). 
 25. ARTHUR K. OKUN, PRICES AND QUANTITIES: A MACROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 169–70 (1981) 
(suggesting that increasing prices due to cost increases is generally accepted as fair while raising prices 
on the basis of increase in demand are not; and that these conventions often shape the behavior of 
sellers); George A. Akerlof, The Case Against Conservative Macroeconomics, 46 ECONOMICS 219, 230–
33 (1979); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit 
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728 (1986) [hereinafter Fairness as a 
Constraint]; Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness and the Assumptions of 
Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285 (1986). 
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plausibly reinforced by the prevailing perception of these rates as fair.26 The 
existing body of literature takes prevailing rates as a reference point; hence, it 
does not answer the questions that interest us most, namely, what determines 
the perceived fairness of CF rates and how these perceptions affect the going 
rates. 
Another body of literature on fairness judgments is rooted in game theory 
and deals with the division of a certain pie between two or more people, that is, 
with division fairness.27 The Ultimatum and Dictator games are particularly 
pertinent to this notion of fairness. Ultimatum is a game in which one person, 
the proposer, is asked to divide a sum of money between herself and another 
person. The other person, the responder, may then either accept the proposed 
division, in which case the division is implemented, or reject it, in which case 
both players receive nothing. Dictator is a game in which one party unilaterally 
decides how to divide a sum of money between herself and another person. 
Rational choice theory predicts that, in an Ultimatum game, the proposer will 
offer the responder the smallest unit of money used in the game and the 
responder will accept this offer and that, in a Dictator game, the dictator will 
appropriate the entire sum. Numerous experiments have established, however, 
that in Ultimatum games, most proposers offer responders a generous share of 
the pie (40% on average) and that responders reject very low offers. Even in 
Dictator games, though the offers are much lower, in most cases they are still 
positive.28 Thus, people do not necessarily behave as rational maximizers of 
their own utility. Instead, they seem to give considerable weight to notions of 
fairness. Responders’ rejections of clearly disproportionate divisions in the 
Ultimatum game indicate that people are even willing to bear some costs to 
punish others for what they perceive as an unfair division of resources.29 There 
is an obvious similarity between these studies and CF arrangements in the sense 
that CFs highlight the division of a pie—the expected recovery—between two 
people, the plaintiff and her attorney.30 
There are, however, important differences between CF arrangements and 
such bargaining games. When a client hires an attorney, none of the parties 
necessarily makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other as in the Ultimatum 
 
 26. See Brickman, supra note 11, at 99 (arguing that clients are led to believe that “[b]ecause all 
lawyers charge the same rate, it is necessarily ‘fair’”). 
 27. See generally STEVEN J. BRAMS & ALAN D. TAYLOR, FAIR DIVISION (1996). 
 28. For a general survey and analysis of the experimental data, see COLIN F. CAMERER, 
BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY: EXPERIMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION 43–117 (2003). 
 29. See id. at 43 (reporting that in Ultimatum games, responders typically reject offers of twenty 
percent or so half the time). 
 30. Instead of, or in addition to, comparing the plaintiff’s share to the total recovery, the plaintiff’s 
net recovery may be compared to her actual loss or injury. This notion may be dubbed compensation 
fairness. Whenever recovery equals the plaintiff’s loss, compensation and division fairness should 
basically converge. However, the total recovery may differ from the actual loss due to such factors as 
statutory limitations on damages or the award of punitive damages. Presumably, the lower the 
plaintiffs’ recovery compared to her actual loss, the more any fee arrangement may be deemed unfair, 
and vice versa. 
ZAMIR & RITOV 3/8/2011   
10 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:1 
game, and certainly none of them enjoys a dictatorship position. More 
fundamentally, a CF arrangement is not only, or even primarily, a way to divide 
a certain pie; it is chiefly a way to remunerate the attorney for her time and 
skill, and to provide her with an incentive to win the case. In that sense, the 
pertinent fairness judgment should presumably refer to the equivalence 
between the attorney’s work and her remuneration, to the fairness of exchange.31 
Put differently, whereas pricing fairness would compare a particular CF rate 
with the prevailing rates in the market, and division fairness would compare the 
attorney’s share of the recovery to the client’s share, fairness of exchange 
compares the attorney’s fee to the value of her work. 
With reference to the notion of output fairness mentioned above, fairness of 
exchange could also be termed input fairness.32 Input plays a major role in 
Equity Theory developed by psychologist Stacy Adams with regard to exchange 
relations in the workplace.33 Fairness of exchange has also been widely discussed 
in contract law scholarship.34 This notion assumes that an attorney deserves a 
higher fee the more time she and her team dedicate to a case, the more talented 
and experienced she is, the better her reputation, and possibly the higher her 
opportunity costs of taking on the client’s case. An attorney does not deserve a 
windfall of a high fee for little work.35 
In contrast to hourly fee arrangements, CF arrangements do not directly 
reflect the input factor. Yet, the attorney’s input presumably affects both the 
case’s outcome and the perceived fairness of the fee.36 The present article only 
 
 31. See Brickman, supra note 11, at 71–72 (arguing that CF arrangements yield windfall fees 
unearned by either risk or effort); Virginia G. Maurer, Robert E. Thomas & Paula A. DeBooth, 
Attorney Fee Arrangements: The U.S. and Western European Perspectives, 19 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 
272, 298–99 (1999) (arguing that an attorney charging on a CF basis may “benefit disproportionately to 
the efforts and risk he invests”). 
 32. Division fairness is not, however, identical to output fairness. Only the latter is pertinent to 
arrangements in which the entitlement to remuneration—but not the remuneration’s size—depends on 
the success of the claim, such as the conditional fee arrangements used in the United Kingdom. For 
comparisons of contingent fee arrangements and conditional fee arrangements, see Winand Emons, 
Conditional Versus Contingent Fees, 59 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 89 (2007); Winand Emons & Nuno 
Garoupa, U.S.-Style Contingent Fees and U.K.-Style Conditional Fees: Agency Problems and the Supply 
of Legal Services, 27 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 379 (2006). At the same time, only division 
fairness is directly relevant to scenarios in which nobody’s input is involved in producing the divided pie 
and thus the very notion of “output” is arguably inapplicable. 
 33. J. Stacy Adams, Toward an Understanding of Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 422 
(1963); Adams, supra note 24. 
 34. See generally P.S. ATIYAH, Contract and Fair Exchange, in ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 329 (1990); 
JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991); James 
Gordley, Equality in Exchange, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1587 (1981) [hereinafter Equality in Exchange]; Eyal 
Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
1710, 1778–82 (1997). 
 35. Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 
FORDHAM L. REV. 247 (1996); Brickman, supra note 12; Brickman, supra note 11, at 72; Maurer et al., 
supra note 31, at 298–99. 
 36. The outcome of the case is affected not only by the attorney’s effort, expertise, and experience, 
but also by her reputation, as the latter may affect the defendant’s willingness to settle a case. 
ZAMIR & RITOV 3/8/2011   
Spring 2011] NOTIONS OF FAIRNESS AND CONTINGENT FEES 11 
considers the amount of time an attorney works on the case because other 
aspects of the attorney’s input are not as easily observed or quantified. 
Notions of fairness ordinarily involve comparisons. Some notions require a 
comparison to external reference points such as the standard CF rates within the 
market (for assessing pricing fairness), or the hourly fee that would have been 
charged for the same service (fairness of exchange). To circumvent the difficulty 
of assessing fairness of exchange in the abstract, one may compare the EHR 
resulting from the CF with the hourly fee the attorney would have charged for 
similar services. Alternatively, the expected CF may be compared to a fixed, 
global fee that the attorney would have charged for handling the same case. 
Division fairness, in contrast, does not rest on such external yardsticks. It may 
be assessed by comparing the shares each person gets of the entire pie, without 
resorting to any external reference. 
It is possible that a certain CF rate would be judged fair under all 
conceivable notions, or unfair under all of them. Often, however, the fairness of 
a CF rate in a particular case may be deemed fair according to one conception 
of fairness and unfair according to another. 
As indicated above, pricing fairness is unhelpful when assessing the fairness 
of the standard CF rate rather than deviations from it. As between fairness of 
exchange and division fairness, only the first should presumably be considered 
relevant in the context of CFs. Compare, for instance, a case in which the 
expected recovery is $50,000 and the prospect of recovery is 75%, with a case in 
which the expected recovery is $500,000 and the prospect of recovery is 90%. 
Let us further assume that the standard hourly fee for legal services in the 
relevant locality is $250, that handling each of the cases is expected to require 
125 hours of work, and that the standard CF is 33% of the recovery. If both 
cases are taken on the basis of a CF of 33%, the attorney is expected to get an 
effective hourly rate of $100 in case A, and $1,200 in case B.37 Put differently, for 
the same amount of work, the lawyer is expected to earn $12,500 in case A, and 
$150,000 in case B. This is compared with $31,250 had she charged a fixed fee 
based on the standard hourly fee ($250) multiplied by the amount of expected 
hours (125). Presumably, in case A, a CF rate of 80%, resulting in an expected 
fee of $30,000 and EHR of $240, should be deemed perfectly fair, and possibly 
even too low, given the insurance and credit elements embodied in CFs. At the 
same time, in case B, a CF rate of 20%, which resulted in an expected CF of 
$90,000 and EHR of $720, should be considered unreasonably high. 
The article will presently describe the experiments designed to discover 
what factors actually determine the perceived fairness of CF arrangements. 
Before doing so, however, some further explanation of the practical significance 
of fairness judgments, that is, the possible ways in which they may affect the 
market for legal services, is in order. 
 
 37. $50,000 × .75 × .33 ÷ 125 = $100; $500,000 × .90 × .33 ÷ 125 = $1,200. 
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B.  Fairness Judgments and the Market for Legal Services 
In addition to their theoretical interest, people’s perceptions of the fairness 
of CF arrangements are potentially important for three practical reasons. First, 
these perceptions might affect clients’ choices among different fee 
arrangements, as well as their decision to hire an attorney in the first place. If 
people dislike being treated unfairly, as the findings of experimental game 
theory described above possibly indicate,38 then they might avoid entering into 
what they perceive as an unfair contract. 
Second, it stands to reason that profit-seeking firms, including attorneys, 
take judgments of fairness into account when setting their prices. Various 
studies have indicated that people do not view agreed-upon prices, or prices 
determined by supply and demand in a certain market at a given point in time, 
as ipso facto fair.39 Firms that wish to enhance their reputation (and decision-
makers in the firm who prefer to act fairly) may thus be expected to take the 
prevailing notions of fairness into account.40 If attorneys know or assume that 
certain fee arrangements are likely to be perceived as unfair, they might refuse 
to handle cases using such arrangements. Note that, under this explanation, 
attorneys may care about the perceived fairness of their conduct even if they do 
not expect it to directly affect the contracting choices of future clients. 
Third, prevailing judgments of fairness may affect the market for legal 
services by affecting the regulation of CFs, both ex ante, when legislators and 
other policy makers consider whether and how to regulate CFs, and ex post, 
when judges are called upon to review such arrangements. Judges and 
legislators often lack the macroeconomic data and expertise necessary to 
evaluate the competitiveness of a market or the efficiency of a regulatory 
scheme. In fact, even experts often disagree about these issues, as the CF debate 
demonstrates. Judges and regulators may thus base their decisions on notions of 
fairness. Furthermore, even if uncontested economic data was available, policy 
makers might view fairness as a more appropriate criterion for regulation, or 
unconsciously base their decisions on judgments of fairness. To the extent that 
policy makers are affected by public opinion and that public opinion reflects 
prevailing standards of fairness, policy makers will be affected by those 
standards.41 In actuality, both judges and legislators sometimes resort to notions 
of fairness as criteria for determining the validity of CF arrangements.42 
 
 38. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
 39. Fairness as a Constraint, supra note 25; Bruno S. Frey & Werner W. Pommerehne, On the 
Fairness of Pricing—An Empirical Survey Among the General Population, 20 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 
295 (1993); ATIYAH, supra note 34, at 331–32 (noting the deeply-embedded notion in Western societies 
that transactions should be substantively fair, and not only the product of a fair contracting process). 
 40. Fairness as a Constraint, supra note 25, at 736–37; Akerlof, supra note 25, at 230–33. 
 41. See generally EDWARD E. ZAJAC, POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FAIRNESS (1995) (discussing 
prevailing notions of fairness, their effect on policy makers, including the courts, and strategic uses of 
fairness arguments by interest groups in various contexts). 
 42. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1114(c) (2010) (“The court may review contingent fee 
agreements for fairness.”); McKenzie Constr., Inc. v. Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 101 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding 
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Conjecturing that judgments of fairness can directly (through the market) 
and indirectly (through the interplay between market actors and regulators) 
affect CF rates, we set out to identify what factors impact these judgments. 
Since the structure of the CF arrangement brings to mind notions of division 
fairness, we hypothesized that the CF rate would have greater effect on people’s 
perceptions of fairness than the claim sum, the probability of success, the 
expected number of hours worked, and the resulting effective hourly rate. An 
additional experiment was designed to examine the correlation between 
people’s fairness judgments and their choice of fee arrangement, thus testing 
the hypothesis that those judgments affect the market through clients’ choices. 
III 
EXPERIMENTS 
A.  Experiment 1: Judgments of Fairness 
The first experiment explored how the perceived fairness of CF 
arrangements is affected by the magnitude of the sum claimed, the probability 
of success, and the CF rate. In a previous experiment, we found no significant 
correlation between the perceived fairness of CF arrangements and any of the 
following variables: (1) the timing of evaluation (prior to contracting with the 
lawyer versus following the successful handling of the case but before paying 
the fee), (2) the type of harm (personal injury versus property damage), and (3) 
the evaluator’s position (the client versus a disinterested third person).43 This 
lack of correlation may either accurately reflect people’s judgments of fairness 
in the real world or stem from the abstract nature of the laboratory experiment. 
In light of the results of that experiment, in the present and following 
experiments, all questions referred to personal injuries and all participants were 
asked to make their judgments from the perspective of a third person, prior to 
contracting. 
1.  Participants 
One hundred and thirteen university students and applicants (46 men and 67 
women) participated in the experiment in exchange for five new Israeli shekels 
(NIS).44 Their ages ranged from 19 to 67, with a mean of 26 years. 
 
that the validity of a CF agreement should be determined according to an “equity and fairness 
standard”); King v. Fox, 418 F.3d 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that, to be valid, a CF arrangement 
should be “fair” both when it is made and at the time of its enforcement). 
 43. Since nobody has argued that the CF arrangements are unfair to the lawyer (who is much more 
familiar with this arrangement and often wealthier than the client), we did not ask respondents to assess 
the fairness of CF arrangements from the lawyer’s perspective. 
 44. One new Israeli shekel roughly equals $0.25. 
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2.  Experimental Design 
This experiment employed eight cases. Each one included details of the 
claim and the CF arrangement. All cases involved personal injury, and were 
evaluated ex ante from the perspective of an uninvolved observer. In all cases, 
the lawyer was expected to spend 100 hours working on the case. Three factors 
were varied orthogonally within subject: the amount claimed (100,000 NIS 
versus 500,000 NIS), the probability of success (65% versus 90%), and the 
proportion of CF (20% versus 55%).45 Thus, each participant was asked to 
assess the fairness of eight cases. The complete list of cases presented, with the 
numerical details for each, is presented in Appendix Table A1. In addition, the 
order of the cases was counterbalanced between subjects using four different 
presentation orders. For each case, participants were asked to indicate their 
evaluation of the fairness of the agreement on a scale ranging from 1 
(“definitely fair”) to 9 (“unfair and excessive”). Although a fee agreement may 
be deemed unfair either because it yields an unduly high remuneration or an 
unduly low one, the present and following experiments focused on excessive 
fees because this is the type of unfairness relevant to the current CF debate. A 
typical question read as follows: 
Imagine that a person was harmed during medical treatment in a hospital and that he 
is considering suing the hospital for damages. The estimation is that, if the court would 
find the hospital liable, the person would receive damages of 100,000 NIS, that the 
claim’s chance of success is 65%, and that a lawyer who would handle the case would 
have to spend 100 working hours. The lawyer whom this person approached is willing 
to take the case for a fee of 20% of the awarded damages (that is, the lawyer will 
receive 20,000 NIS if the claim is successful and 0 NIS if the claim is dismissed). 
How would you describe this fee along a scale of 1 to 9, where 1 indicates a definitely 
fair fee and 9 indicates an unfair and excessive fee (mark one number): 
Definitely fair  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  Unfair and excessive 
3.  Results 
Although order of presentation had a significant effect across cases,46 it did 
not significantly interact with any of the three factors. Our main concern is the 
effect of the three factors: claim sum, probability of success, and CF rate. 
Hence, for the following analyses, the data was collapsed across presentation 




 45. To keep the questions simple, the cases did not mention the possibility of obtaining different 
amounts of damages in different probabilities. Even if this gap leaves some ambiguity in the 
description, it should not affect the results since this ambiguity is common to all cases. 
 46. F(3, 106)=6.173, p=0.001, in a repeated measure analysis of variance (ANOVA) of fairness 
ratings by factors and order. The mean unfairness rating across cases was higher in the two 
questionnaires that began with cases that were considered less unfair than in the two questionnaires 
that began with cases that were considered more unfair. Thus, the case encountered first seems to affect 
subsequent judgments perhaps due to a contrast effect. 
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Table 1: Mean Unfairness Ratings in Experiment 1 
Claim Sum 100,000 500,000 
Probability of Success 65% 90% Overall 65% 90% Overall 
CF = 20% 3.36 3.56 3.44 3.82 4.25 4.01 
CF = 55% 6.14 6.56 6.32 6.24 6.95 6.54 
Overall 4.75 5.04 4.89 4.97 5.56 5.27 
 
Each of the three factors contributed significantly to the perceived 
unfairness of the lawyer’s fee. Specifically, the lawyer’s fee is perceived as more 
unfair the larger the total claim, the higher the probability of success, and the 
higher the CF rate.47 The EHR is a product of these three factors. Hence, to the 
extent that the EHR plays a role, this should be reflected in significant 
interaction effects. However, the three factors seem to have an additive effect 
on the evaluation as none of the interactions reached a significant level. 
Although all three factors affect unfairness judgments, the impact of the CF 
rate clearly overshadows the other two factors. For each subject, the difference 
in mean judgment between cases with a high value and cases with a low value 
was computed for each of the factors. A repeated analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) of the resulting differences showed a significant difference between 
the three: increasing the CF rate from 20% to 55% increased average unfairness 
by 2.70 on a scale of 1 to 9, whereas increasing the claim from 100,000 to 500,000 
NIS increased average unfairness by only 0.38, and increasing the probability of 
success from 65% to 90% increased average unfairness by only 0.44. Thus, the 
impact of the CF rate was several times greater than the impact of the other two 
factors. This conclusion should, however, be taken with care as the differences 
between the high and low values of each of the three factors—claim sum, 
success probability, and CF rate—and the scales on which they are indicated are 
dissimilar and do not lend themselves to straightforward comparison. 
B.  Experiment 2: Separate Evaluations 
In this experiment, the same cases were presented as in Experiment 1, with 
each participant evaluating a single case. Thus, it was a completely between-
subject design. Since all relevant judgments of fairness are conventionally based 
on comparisons, it was interesting to examine whether respondents’ answers 
would present the same pattern as in Experiment 1 when each respondent was 
presented with a single case. 
 
 47. F(1, 109)=10.239, F(1, 109)=42.768, and F(1, 109)=192.425, for claim value, probability of 
success, and CF rate, respectively, in a repeated measure ANOVA of the eight unfairness ratings by the 
three independent factors. p<0.01 in all cases. 
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1.  Participants 
Two hundred and forty-nine students (130 men and 119 women) 
participated in the experiment voluntarily. Their ages ranged from 18 to 57, 
with a mean of 25 years. 
2.  Experimental Design 
Experiment 2 used the same eight cases as Experiment 1. The complete list 
of the cases is presented in Appendix Table A1. 
3.  Results 
The results essentially replicated those of the within-subject Experiment 1. 
All three factors—the CF rate, the amount claimed, and the probability of 
success—had a significant effect on the perceived fairness of the fee, but the CF 
rate seems to have a greater impact. Increasing the claim sum from 100,000 NIS 
to 500,000 NIS increased the mean unfairness rating by 0.73, from 5.02 to 5.75, 
increasing the probability of success from 65% to 90% increased mean 
unfairness by 0.53, from 5.13 to 5.66, and increasing CF rate from 20% to 55% 
increased mean unfairness by 1.59, from 4.59 to 6.18 (all on a scale of 1 to 9). 
Table 2 presents the mean unfairness rating for all combinations of the three 
factors. 
 
Table 2: Mean Unfairness Ratings in Experiment 2 
Claim Sum 100,000 500,000 
Probability of Success 65% 90% Overall 65% 90% Overall 
CF = 20% 3.74 4.24 3.98 5.56 4.75 5.16 
CF = 55% 5.28 6.74 6.00 5.90 6.84 6.37 
Overall 4.52 5.53 5.02 5.73 5.78 5.75 
C.  Experiments 3 and 4: Changing CF Rates 
In Experiment 1, the ratio between the two claim sums was 1:5, the ratio 
between the two probabilities of success was 1:1.38, and the ratio between the 
two CF rates was 1:2.75. Because it is difficult to draw general conclusions from 
a single set of variables, Experiments 3 and 4 were designed to examine the 
generality of the results of Experiment 1 using different values of CF rates. 
1.  Participants 
Eighty students participated in the experiment in exchange for 5 NIS. Forty-
one students (21 men and 20 women), whose ages ranged from 20 to 50, with a 
mean of 26, participated in Experiment 3. Thirty-nine students (19 men and 20 
women), whose ages ranged from 18 to 60, with a mean of 25 years, participated 
in Experiment 4. 
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2.  Experimental Design 
The experimental design of Experiments 3 and 4 was identical to that of 
Experiment 1 except for changing the CF rates. Thus, in each experiment, three 
factors were varied orthogonally within subject: the amount claimed (100,000 
NIS versus 500,000 NIS), the probability of success (65% percent versus 90%) 
and the CF rate (30% versus 40% in Experiment 3 and 45% versus 55% in 
Experiment 4). The complete list of cases, with their respective numerical 
details, is presented in Appendix Tables A2 and A3. In all cases, the lawyer was 
expected to spend 100 hours on the case. The order of the cases was 
counterbalanced between subjects, using four different presentation orders. 
3.  Results 
The order of the cases did not have a significant main effect,48 nor did it 
interact with the other factors. Since our main hypothesis concerns the effect of 
the three factors—claim sum, probability of success, and CF rate—in the 
following analyses, the data was collapsed across presentation orders. Table 3 
presents the mean unfairness rating for all combinations of the three factors 
separately for each of the experiments. 
 
Table 3: Mean Unfairness Ratings in Experiments 3 and 4 
 Claim Sum 100,000 500,000 
 Probability of 
Success 
65% 90% Overall 65% 90% Overall 
CF = 30% 3.83 4.49 4.16 4.59 5.22 4.90 
CF = 40% 5.29 5.66 5.48 5.59 6.63 6.11 
Experiment 3 
Overall 4.56 5.07 4.82 5.09 5.93 5.51 
CF = 45% 4.44 5.12 4.78 4.93 6.02 5.48 
CF = 55% 5.25 6.07 5.66 5.98 6.78 6.38 
Experiment 4 
Overall 4.84 5.60 5.22 5.45 6.40 5.93 
 
In both experiments, each of the three factors contributed significantly to 
the perceived unfairness of the lawyer’s fee. Specifically, the lawyer’s fee was 
judged as more unfair the larger the total claim, the higher the probability of 
success, and the higher the lawyer’s share.49 Again, these factors seem to have 
an additive effect on the evaluation as none of the interactions reached a 
significant level. 
 
 48. A main effect is the effect of the variable averaging over all levels of other variables in the 
experiment. 
 49. F(1, 40)=8.477, F(1, 40)=7.969, and F(1, 40)=40.988, for claim value, probability of success, and 
the lawyer’s share in Set 1, respectively, in a repeated measure ANOVA of the eight unfairness ratings 
by the three independent factors. p<0.01 for all main effects. F(1, 40)=8.085, F(1, 40)=9.867, and F(1, 
40)=43.316, for claim value, probability of success, and the lawyer’s share in Set 2, respectively, in a 
repeated measure ANOVA of the eight unfairness ratings by the three independent factors. p<0.01 for 
all main effects. 
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As in Experiment 1, the difference in mean fairness judgment between cases 
with a high value and cases with a low value for each of the factors was 
computed for each participant. For Experiment 3, a repeated ANOVA of the 
three resulting differences showed a significant difference between the three: 
increasing the CF rate from 30% to 40% increased average unfairness by 1.26 
on a scale of 1 to 9, whereas increasing the claimed amount from 100,000 NIS to 
500,000 NIS increased average unfairness by 0.69, and increasing the probability 
of success from 65% to 90% increased average unfairness by 0.68. Thus, the 
impact of the CF rate was considerably greater than the impact of the other two 
factors although the ratio between the two CF rates was 1:1.33 and the ratio 
between the claimed sums was 1:5, and the ratio between the two probabilities 
of success was 1:1.38. 
In Experiment 4, in contrast, the differences between the effects of the three 
factors were not significant: increasing the CF rate from 45% to 55% increased 
average perceived unfairness by 0.89, whereas increasing the claimed sum from 
100,000 NIS to 500,000 NIS increased average unfairness by 0.71, and increasing 
the probability of success from 65% to 90% increased average unfairness by 
0.85. 
D.  Experiment 5: Varying Working Hours 
In the first four experiments, the three variables were the claimed sum, the 
probability of recovery, and the CF rate while the hours the attorney was 
expected to spend on the case remained constant. To examine the effect of 
varying the hours worked, the probability of success was held constant in 
Experiment 5, and the expected hours required to handle the case were varied 
instead. 
1.  Participants 
One hundred and two students (43 men and 59 women) participated in the 
experiment in exchange for 5 NIS. Their ages ranged from 19 to 67, with a mean 
of 25 years. 
2.  Experimental Design 
The experimental design of Experiment 5 was based on the design of 
Experiments 1, 3, and 4. To avoid doubling the number of cases, the same 
probability of success, 80%, was indicated in all cases. Three factors were thus 
varied orthogonally within subject: the amount claimed (100,000 NIS versus 
500,000 NIS), the hours the lawyer was expected to spend on the case (100 
versus 40), and the CF rate (20% versus 40%). The complete list of cases, with 
their numerical details, is presented in Appendix Table A4. In addition, the 
order of the cases was counterbalanced between subjects, using four different 
presentation orders. 
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3.  Results 
Although the order of the cases had a significant overall effect,50 it did not 
significantly interact with any of the three factors. Therefore, for the following 
analyses, the data was collapsed across orders. Table 4 presents the mean 
unfairness rating for all combinations of the three factors. 
 
Table 4: Mean Unfairness Rating in Experiment 5 
Claim Sum 100,000 500,000 
Number of Hours 100 40 Overall 100 40 Overall 
CF = 20% 4.12 4.64 4.37 4.58 5.50 5.04 
CF = 40% 5.08 6.02 5.56 5.90 6.60 6.28 
Overall 4.59 5.33 4.95 5.24 6.05 5.65 
 
Each of the three factors contributed significantly to the unfairness 
judgment of the lawyer’s fee. The lawyer’s fee was judged as more unfair the 
larger the claimed sum, the lower the estimated hours worked, and the higher 
the CF rate.51 As in the previous experiments, the interactions between the 
factors did not reach a significant level. To compare the relative impact of the 
differences along the three factors, once again, the difference in mean judgment 
between cases with a high value and cases with a low value for each of the 
factors was computed. A repeated-measure ANOVA of the three resulting 
differences as a within-subject factor yielded a significant effect.52 Increasing the 
CF rate from 20% to 40% increased average unfairness by 1.22, whereas 
increasing the claim sum from 100,000 NIS to 500,000 NIS increased average 
unfairness by 0.70, and decreasing the working hours from 100 to 40 increased 
average unfairness by 0.77. Thus, while the CF rate was increased by a factor of 
2, its effect on the judged unfairness was considerably greater than the effect of 
increasing the claim sum by a factor of 5, and decreasing the number of hours 
worked by a factor of 2.5. 
E.  Experiment 6: Judgments and Choices 
As indicated above, perceptions of unfairness may affect market behavior 
through clients’ choices, lawyers’ choices, and regulation. To test the first 
possibility, Experiment 6 examined plaintiffs’ choices between CF and fixed fee 
(FF) arrangements in eight scenarios corresponding to the scenarios described 
in Experiment 1. The details of the cases used in Experiment 6 closely follow 
the details of the cases used in Experiment 1 except for two complementary 
 
 50. F(3, 97)=4.061, p<0.01 in a repeated-measure ANOVA of fairness ratings by factors and order. 
The mean unfairness rating across problems was lowest in the two questionnaires that began with a 
case that was considered the most unfair. As in Experiment 1, here too the case encountered first seems 
to affect subsequent judgments, probably due to a contrast effect. 
 51. F(1, 97)=26.694, F(1, 97)=36.927, and F(1, 97)=71.723, for claimed sum, number of hours, and 
CF rate, respectively. p<0.01 for each of the three factors. 
 52. F(2, 202)=5.661, p<0.01. 
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modifications. In both experiments, we used the same set of cases in terms of 
the probabilities of success and CF rates. However, in Experiment 6, both the 
claimed sum and the expected number of working hours were divided by two. 
For instance, while Case 8 in Experiment 1 referred to a claim of 500,000 NIS 
with a 90% probability of success, a CF rate of 55%, and 100 working hours, the 
corresponding case in Experiment 6 referred to a claim of 250,000 NIS with the 
same probability of success and CF rate, but only 50 working hours. Hence, the 
EHR in both experiments was identical, but the expected fee was half as large 
in the choice experiment. In all cases, respondents were asked to choose 
between hiring a lawyer on a CF basis, hiring a lawyer on an FF basis, and not 
handling the case at all. In all cases, the ratio between FF and the expected 
contingent fee (ECF), that is, the amount claimed multiplied by the probability 
of success and by the percentage of CF, was 1:2.5. Thus, by dividing both the 
claimed sum and the expected number of working hours by 2, we 
correspondingly decreased the FF in each case by 2. The FF sum thus ranged 
from 2,600 NIS to 49,500 NIS, which we assumed would be closer to what a 
student respondent could reasonably afford. The ratio of 1:2.5 between the FF 
and the ECF was chosen based on the results of other experiments revealing 
people’s preferences regarding attorneys’ fees. Those experiments indicated 
that while less than half of the respondents prefer CF when the FF:ECF ratio is 
1:3.3, more than half prefer CF when the ratio is 1:2.53 
1.  Participants 
Forty-three students (15 men and 27 women, one participant did not 
indicate gender) participated in the experiment in exchange for 5 NIS. Their 
ages ranged from 19 to 53, with a mean of 25. 
2.  Experimental Design 
We employed eight decision problems. Each subject was presented with 
eight scenarios, varying as to the sum claimed (50,000 NIS versus 250,000 NIS), 
the probability of success (65% versus 90%), and the CF rate (20% versus 
55%). These three factors were varied orthogonally within subject. In addition, 
two different presentation orders of the eight problems, as well as two orders of 
the CF and FF options, were counterbalanced across subjects. All cases 
involved physical injury caused during medical treatment in a hospital. In all 
scenarios, the attorney was expected to work 50 hours on the case. Subjects 
were asked to decide which fee arrangement, CF or FF, they would prefer as a 
plaintiff. The complete list of cases is presented in Appendix Table A5. A 
typical question read as follows: 
Imagine that, during a treatment in a hospital, damage was caused to your left hand 
and that you are considering suing the hospital for damages. It is estimated that if the 
 
 53. Zamir & Ritov, supra note 1, at 267–68. Note that the information regarding the expected 
working hours was actually immaterial in the choice problems, as the choice was between a contingent 
fee and a fixed fee, and not between the former and an hourly fee. 
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court would rule that the hospital is liable for the injury, you would receive damages 
of 50,000 NIS, that the suit’s chance of success is 65%, and that the attorney who 
would handle the case will have to spend about 50 working hours. 
You may choose one of the following three options: 
A. Ask a lawyer to represent you in claiming damages for 20% of the sum received 
following his handling of the case (if the damages were obtained, the lawyer would get 
10,000 NIS; if no damages were obtained, the lawyer would get nothing). Assume that 
the lawyer bears all of the costs involved in handling the case. 
B. Ask a lawyer to represent you in claiming damages for a fixed sum of 2,600 NIS (to 
be paid even if you receive no damages at all). Assume that the lawyer bears all of the 
costs involved in handling the case. 
C. Avoid handling the matter. 
What option would you prefer? (Circle the appropriate answer) A B C 
3.  Results 
Table 5 presents the percent of participants who preferred CF over FF in 
each case. A repeated-measure ANOVA predicting choice in each of the eight 
cases from claim value, probability of success, and CF rate yielded a significant 
effect for probability of success as well as a significant effect for the claim 
value.54 The effect of the CF rate did not approach a significant level (p=0.3), 
and neither did any of the interactions. Overall, respondents preferred CF in 
4.49 out of 8 cases. Thus, in 58% of the choices (excluding avoidance), 
respondents preferred the CF option over FF even when the expected CF was 
2.5 times higher than the FF. 
 
 Table 5: Percent of CF Choices, Out of All Non-Avoidance Choices55 
 
IV 
ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS 
A.  Division Fairness Versus Fairness of Exchange 
The experiments examining judgments of fairness revealed that all four 
factors—the sum claimed, the probability of success, the CF rate, and the 
expected working hours—affect the perceived fairness of a CF arrangement. 
These findings make perfect sense. The larger each of the first three factors, and 
the smaller the fourth factor, the higher the lawyer’s fee, and, thus, the more it 
 
 54. F(1, 42)=42.743, p<0.001 and F(1, 42)=17.99, p<0.001, respectively. 
 55. In each cell, no more than three respondents chose the avoidance option. 
Claim Sum 50,000 250,000 
Probability of Success 65% 90% 65% 90% 
CF = 20% 64.3 23.8 92.7 52.4 
CF = 55% 68.3 34.1 80.0 53.7 
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is likely to be considered “unfair and excessive.”56 However, the 
disproportionate weight of the CF rate indicates that the fairness of CF 
arrangements is primarily seen as raising an issue of division fairness rather 
than fairness of exchange. Viewed from the perspective of fairness of 
exchange—which is presumably the appropriate one—the experiments’ results 
are counterintuitive and even strange. Compare, for example, Case 2 in 
Experiment 1—involving a 100,000 NIS claim with a 65% probability of success 
and a CF rate of 55%—to Case 7 in the same experiment—involving a 500,000 
NIS claim with a 90% probability of success and a CF rate of 20%. Although in 
the latter case, the lawyer assumes a smaller risk, and her EHR is more than 2.5 
times greater than in the former (900 NIS compared to 357.5 NIS), the fee 
arrangement in the latter case is considered much fairer (4.25 compared to 
6.14). Similarly, although the EHR in Case 5 is considerably higher than the 
EHR in Cases 2 and 4 of the same experiment (650 NIS compared to 357.5 NIS 
and 495 NIS, respectively), the CF arrangement in Case 5 is considered much 
fairer than in Cases 2 and 4 (3.82 compared to 6.14 and 6.56, respectively). 
Similar observations apply to Experiment 3. Compare, for instance, Case 
7—claimed sum of 500,000 NIS, 90% probability of success, and a 30% CF 
rate—in which the effective hourly rate is 1,350 NIS, with Case 2—claimed sum 
of 100,000 NIS, 65% success probability, and 40% CF rate—in which the EHR 
is 260 NIS. Despite the fact that in Case 7, the attorney is expected to earn a 
sum that is more than 5 times greater than in Case 2, the perceived unfairness of 
the two cases is almost identical, and in fact, it is slightly higher for Case 2 (5.29 
compared to 5.22). Similarly, although the EHR in Case 5 (975 NIS) is 3.75 and 
2.7 times greater than the EHRs in Cases 2 and 4 (260 NIS and 360 NIS), 
respectively, the perceived unfairness of the CF in Case 5 (4.59) is considerably 
smaller than the perceived unfairness in Cases 2 (5.29) and 4 (5.66). 
Although the mean effect of the CF rate on the perceived unfairness of CF 
in Experiment 4 was not much higher than the mean effect of the probability of 
success and the sum claimed (0.89, compared to 0.85 and 0.71), some of the 
results of this experiment are similarly counterintuitive. Thus, although the 
effective hourly rate in Case 5 (1,462.5 NIS) is approximately four times higher 
than in Case 2 (357.5 NIS) and three times higher than in Case 4 (495 NIS), the 
perceived unfairness in Case 5 (4.93) is smaller than in Case 2 (5.25) and Case 4 
(6.07). These striking results are due to the fact that, in this experiment, the 
ratio between the two values of CF rates (45% and 55%), 1:1.22, was smaller 
than the ratio between the two amounts claimed (100,000 NIS and 500,000 
NIS), 1:5, and between the two probabilities of success (65% and 90%), 1:1.38. 
Finally, the results of Experiment 5 follow the pattern of Experiments 1 and 
3 and present similar peculiarities. For instance, although the effective hourly 
 
 56. Since the participants in this experiment were laypersons, who are unlikely to know what the 
prevailing rates in the market for legal services in Israel are, it is improbable that their judgments were 
in any way affected by a comparison between the details provided in the questions and the prevailing 
rates. 
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rate in Case 7 of this experiment (2,000 NIS) is 2.5 times higher than in Case 4 
(800 NIS), the perceived unfairness in Case 7 (5.5), in which the CF rate is 20%, 
is smaller than in Case 4 (6.02), in which the CF rate is 40%. Similarly, while the 
EHR in Case 5 (800 NIS) is 2.5 times higher than in Case 2 (320 NIS), the 
perceived unfairness in Case 5, in which the CF rate was 20% (4.58) is smaller 
than in Case 2, in which the CF rate was 40% (5.08). 
It thus seems that the impact of the attorney’s share on the perceived 
fairness of CF arrangements is considerably stronger than the other three 
factors—the probability of success, the sum claimed, and the hours spent on the 
case. This is true not only when the ratio between the compared CF rates was 
1:2.75, but also when it was much smaller. At the same time, although in our 
experiments, the sum claimed had the greatest effect on the attorney’s 
remuneration because the ratio between the two values was 1:5, its effect on the 
perceived unfairness was relatively small. This result may have to do with the 
decreasing marginal utility of money. In any case, the most striking result of the 
first five experiments is that the very use of the CF obscures its role as a means 
of calculating remuneration for work done and highlights its role in dividing the 
pie—thus invoking judgments based on notions of division fairness rather than 
fairness of exchange. Arguably, the disproportionate impact of the CF rate on 
the perceived fairness of the fee arrangement stems from the fact that unlike 
the other factors—claimed sum, chance of success, and working hours—it is 
volitionally determined by the lawyer. However, none of these factors is truly 
exogenous, as they all depend on the lawyer’s behavior. More importantly, this 
difference between the various factors is not a product of our experimental 
design, but rather a feature of CF arrangements in the real world. It thus 
remains true that CF arrangements primarily invoke notions of division 
fairness. 
It should be noted that no support was found for the hypothesis that these 
judgments are due to framing effects.57 In a separate between-subject 
experiment, we used three different depictions of the CF arrangement. One 
depiction indicated only the percentage of recovery (as is common in the real 
world), another specified only the contingent global sum, and the third denoted 
only a contingent hourly rate.58 Although the perceived unfairness of the fee 
arrangement was highest in the contingent hourly rate framing and lowest in the 
percentage framing, these differences did not approach a significant level.59 
 
 57. Framing effect refers to the dependence of a choice on the manner in which an option is 
presented, so that changing the presentation format alters people’s choices. 
 58. For instance, we used a case in which the claimed sum was 300,000 NIS, the chance of success 
80%, and the lawyer was expected to spend 100 hours on the case. The first version indicated that the 
lawyer will receive 25% of the recovery, the second version referred to a global fee of 75,000 NIS, and 
the third to an hourly fee of 750 NIS, if the claim succeeds (clarifying, in all three versions, that if the 
claim fails, the lawyer gets nothing). The attorney’s expected fee is the same under all three framings. 
 59. Similarly, in another experiment, where the three factors of claimed sum, probability of 
success, and CF rate were varied orthogonally within subject, and the CF arrangement was described to 
some respondents as a percentage of recovery and to others as a contingent hourly fee (with the same 
ZAMIR & RITOV 3/8/2011   
24 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:1 
Our findings also shed light on a more general aspect of fairness judgments, 
namely, the role of comparisons. Specifically, the results of Experiments 1, 3, 
and 4 display a contrast effect.60 Thus, a CF rate of 55% was considered more 
unfair in Experiment 1, in which it was juxtaposed to a CF rate of 20%, than in 
Experiment 4, in which it was juxtaposed to a CF rate of 45%.61 In the same 
vein, the overall unfairness rating of a CF rate of 45% that was presented along 
with a CF rate of 55% in Experiment 4 was judged fairer than a CF rate of 40% 
that was presented along with a CF rate of 30% in Experiment 3.62 It seems that 
people do not have a precise, cardinal scale of fairness. Rather, they base their 
judgments of fairness on comparisons to some baselines. This observation must 
not, however, be overstated. For one thing, the same pattern of fairness 
judgments was manifest in Experiments 1 and 2, despite the fact that in the 
latter, each respondent was presented with a single case. Presumably, therefore, 
people do have some general notions of fairness that do not hinge on the data 
specifically presented to them. The fact that the mean unfairness rating of the 
lower CF rate presented in Experiments 1, 3, and 4 (20%, 30%, and 45%, 
respectively) increased the higher the CF rate was, also supports this 
conjecture.63 
B.  Judgments, Choices, and Regulation 
Very high CF rates may be mutually beneficial, especially if the expected 
recovery is relatively small and the plaintiff does not have the means to finance 
legal services.64 According to the available data, however, such rates are actually 
rare.65 Can the perceived unfairness of very high CF rates explain its rarity? 
 
clarification in both versions regarding the resulting total amount), the between-subject framing factor 
did not significantly affect perceived unfairness, nor did it significantly interact with any of the three 
within-subject factors. 
 60. On anchoring (contrast and assimilation) effects in fairness judgments, see, e.g., Barry 
Markovsky, Anchoring Justice, 51 SOC. PHSYCOL. Q. 213 (1988). 
 61. Overall unfairness ratings of 6.32 and 6.54 for the 100,000 NIS and 500,000 NIS claim sums, 
respectively, in Experiment 1 compared to 5.66 and 6.38 for the two claim sums in Experiment 4. 
 62. Overall unfairness ratings of 4.78 and 5.48 for the 100,000 NIS and 500,000 NIS claim sums, 
respectively, in Experiment 5 compared to 5.48 and 6.11 for the two claim sums in Experiment 3. 
 63. The mean unfairness rates for the lower CF rate in the three experiments were 3.44, 4.16, and 
4.78 for the 100,000 NIS claim sum, and 4.01, 4.90, and 5.48 for the 500,000 NIS claim sum, respectively. 
It should be noted, however, that the three experiments differed not only with regard to the value of 
the lower CF rate, but also with regard to the ratio between the low and the high CF rate in each 
experiment. As the lower CF rate increased, the ratio between the two rates decreased, and it may be 
argued that this decrease affected the fairness assessments. 
 64. Excluding such claims may be socially desirable if the costs they impose on the court system are 
larger than their benefits to the parties involved. However, this consideration is unlikely to affect the 
behavior of the plaintiff and her attorney. 
 65. RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 8, at 37–43 (finding that only about one 
percent of CF arrangements in Wisconsin based on a flat rate had fees exceeding one-third of recovery 
and citing other studies that found CF arrangements in excess of one-third to vary between ten and 
twelve percent of the total). 
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Although the probability of success and the sum claimed yielded a 
significant effect on the preference for the CF over the FF in Experiment 6, the 
effect of the CF rate did not approach a significant level. This result may seem 
surprising given the large difference between CF rates of 20% and 55%, and the 
robust difference in the perceived fairness of the two rates as found in 
Experiment 1. This result is less surprising once one recalls that, to maintain a 
constant ratio of 1:2.5 between the FF and ECF, the FF in the cases of the 55% 
CF rate was quite high—possibly prohibitively high for some respondents in 
some of the cases (as fixed and hourly fees are, in fact, for some plaintiffs in the 
real world). 
The design of the experiments does not allow for general claims about the 
relationships between plaintiffs’ fairness judgments and their choices. First, the 
choices examined in Experiment 6 called for a comparison of a CF to a FF. As 
the experiments did not study fairness perceptions of fixed fee arrangements, 
one cannot unequivocally rule out the possibility that the choices were affected 
by perceived relative fairness of the two options. Second, the evaluation mode 
was different in the judgment and the choice experiments. In the five fairness 
experiments, the participants assessed the fairness of each CF arrangement on 
its own, rather than the relative fairness of different arrangements; whereas in 
the choice experiment, the choice was made between two alternatives (three, if 
one includes the avoidance option). 
Earlier research suggests that, for the same set of options, tasks that call for 
comparative judgment and tasks that rest on isolated judgments may yield 
different rankings. This has been shown for fairness versus preference,66 
satisfaction versus choice,67 and other domains.68 It is possible that the mode of 
evaluation played a role in this article’s experiments as well. Although this 
plausible argument limits our ability to draw general conclusions regarding the 
relationship between fairness and preferences from the experiments, it does not 
 
 66. See generally David M. Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness, Preference, and Fairness Bias, in 
EQUITY THEORY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 61 (David M. Messick & 
Karen S. Cook eds., 1983); David M. Messick & Keith Sentis, Fairness and Preference, 15 J. 
EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 418 (1979); Max H. Bazerman, George F. Lownestein & Sally Blount 
White, Reversals of Preference in Allocation Decisions: Judging an Alternative Versus Choosing Among 
Alternatives, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 220 (1992); Max H. Bazerman et al., The Inconsistent Role of 
Comparison Others and Procedural Justice in Reactions to Hypothetical Job Descriptions: Implication 
for Job Acceptance Decisions, 60 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 326 
(1994); Max H. Bazerman, Sally Blount White & George F. Loewenstein, Perceptions of Fairness in 
Interpersonal and Individual Choice Situations, 4 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 39 (1995); 
Wen-Qiang Bian & L. Robin Keller, Patterns of Fairness Judgments in North America and the People’s 
Republic of China, 8 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 301 (1999). 
 67. Amos Tversky & Dale Griffin, Endowment and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being, in 
SUBJECTIVE WELL-BEING: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVE, 101, 113–15 (Fritz Strack et al. 
eds., 1991). 
 68. See Christopher K. Hsee, George F. Lowenstien, Sally Blount & Max H. Bazerman, Preference 
Reversals Between Joint and Separate Evaluations of Options: A Review and Theoretical Analysis, 125 
PSYCHOL. BULL. 576 (1999) (reviewing the literature and proposing an explanation for the 
phenomenon of preference reversal between joint and separate evaluations). 
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detract from its relevance to the market for legal services. Experiment 6 
suggests that, whenever a plaintiff would face a choice between CF and FF 
arrangements, she would not likely base her decision on abstract notions of 
fairness. In cases of small expected recovery (the claimed sum multiplied by the 
probability of success) in which plaintiffs face a choice between a very high CF 
rate, a relatively high non-contingent fee, and avoiding any action, plaintiffs will 
likely opt for the very high CF rate.69 
To the extent that the rarity of very high CF rates has to do with its 
perceived unfairness, it thus seems that this is not primarily due to plaintiffs’ 
preferences. The remaining possible mechanisms are (1) the preferences of 
attorneys who care about their reputation and do not wish to be viewed as 
charging excessively high fees, and (2) the interplay between the bar and the 
courts and the legislators who regulate CF rates. While we have not tested these 
interrelated hypotheses experimentally, they both seem plausible and the latter 
actually coheres with our findings. 
Firms that care about their reputation are likely to avoid actions that are 
commonly perceived as unfair, even if such actions are profitable, legal, and not 
obviously dishonest.70 This “fairness constraint” may be particularly effective 
where reputation and personal trust loom large as in the market for legal 
services. Assume that, due to a small expected recovery or a slim chance of 
success, representing a plaintiff on a CF basis in a certain case is deemed 
profitable only if the CF would be 70% of the recovery. If the attorney knows 
such a CF would be considered unfair by most people and, hence, adversely 
affect her reputation once made public, she would probably refuse to take the 
case on a CF basis.71 She will either refuse to take the case or accept it on an 
hourly fee basis (explaining to the client, one should hope, the expected costs 
and benefits of pursuing the case). This would be the case even if the client 
were perfectly willing to hire the attorney on a CF basis. Lawyers who strive to 
enhance their reputation, who are attentive to the recurring public debates 
about legal fees, and who may fear further regulation, plausibly take prevailing 
notions of fairness into account when setting their fees.72 The very fact that, 
 
 69. This conclusion holds whether the attorney offers the client such a choice or (which is more 
often the case in some legal fields) only offers her the standard CF arrangement. Even if the latter may 
seem unfair in the abstract, the client would prefer it over a fixed fee. The client would therefore either 
refrain from raising the issue or, when offered such a choice in response to her inquiry, stick to the CF 
arrangement. 
 70. Fairness as a Constraint, supra note 25. The alternative explanation, according to which lawyers 
do not work for very high CF rates because the cases in which such rates might be mutually beneficial 
are very risky, is less persuasive. A lawyer who handles many cases is presumably risk-neutral. 
 71. Cf. RICHARD MOORHEAD & REBECCA CUMMING, DAMAGE-BASED CONTINGENCY FEES IN 
EMPLOYMENT CASES 43, 81–82 (2008, updated 2009) (finding that “a high risk case is more likely to be 
refused contingency funding in the first place than taken on but for a higher potential fee”). 
 72. An indirect support for this conjecture may be found in the answers lawyers gave Herbert 
Kritzer when asked to explain why they sometimes collect fees that are less than what the retainer 
agreement entitles them to: 
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unlike other fee arrangements, a CF invokes notions of division fairness, which 
do not hinge on any external benchmark, makes it easier for people to form an 
opinion on the fairness of these arrangements. These opinions may then fuel the 
public debate, which, in turn, affects lawyers’ conduct. The hypothesized 
fairness constraint possibly protects clients from exploitation by lawyers, yet, at 
the same time, it also hinders mutually beneficial bargains and obstructs poor 
people’s access to justice. 
Turning to the interplay between the bar, the courts, and the legislators, the 
experiments’ findings are compatible with the rulings of American courts 
reviewing CF arrangements. Like the respondents in our experiments, courts at 
least rhetorically pay heed to all the circumstances of the case, including the 
scope of the attorney’s work, the sum claimed, the risk involved in the case, and 
the CF rate.73 However—once again, much like our respondents—the courts 
seem to give more weight to the CF rate than to other variables. On the one 
hand, courts do not generally interfere when the CF rate is low,74 even though 
the EHR in such cases may be quite high when the claimed sum and chance of 
success are sufficiently large and the amount of work is sufficiently small. On 
the other hand, courts invalidate very high CF rates despite the fact that such 
rates may result in low EHRs whenever the sum claimed and the chance of 
success are relatively low, or the amount of work is sufficiently large. Thus, 
commentators have observed that “[j]udicial tolerance of fee percentages seems 
to end at 50 percent.”75 Although our findings do not indicate a particular 
 
[S]ome lawyers expressed the view that the lawyer should not walk away with more than 
the client; in cases in which substantial payments had to be made to subrogated parties, 
lawyers often reduced their fee to a level that they split with the client what was left after 
paying the subrogated claims. 
RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS, supra note 8, at 41. 
 73. See, e.g., Garden Hill Land Corp. v. Succession of Cambre, 306 So. 2d 718, 723 (La. 1975) 
(holding that an attorney representing a minor in probate proceedings should be allowed to prove that 
a “50% contingency fee contract was reasonable . . . taking into account among other things, the risk of 
non-recovery, the amount of legal work, the size of the minor’s estate, and the anticipated delay in 
receipt of his fee . . . .”). See also Clark v. Sage, 629 P.2d 657, 661 (Idaho 1981) (mentioning nine 
different factors that courts and administrative agencies must consider in determining a reasonable fee 
on a contingent fee basis); ARONSON, supra note 4, at 92 (“[R]easonableness depends on the 
circumstances of the case.”); ROSSI, supra note 4, at 111–12 (“Courts have generally stated that the 
reasonableness of a contingency fee contract should be looked at in light of the factors as they existed 
at the time the contract was entered into . . . .”). 
 74. ARONSON, supra note 4, at 91 (observing that “a 25 percent contingent fee has been generally 
approved,” and that courts have also approved contingent fees in the range of one-third). 
 75. Id. at 92. Accord TOOTHMAN & ROSS, supra note 20, at 178; Brickman, supra note 9, at 32; 
Greg N. Anderson, Survey of the Law of Professional Responsibility, 41 IND. L. REV. 1213, 1223 (2008). 
ZAMIR & RITOV 3/8/2011   
28 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 74:1 
significance for 50%,76 CF rates of 20% or 30% are regarded as relatively fair, 
and CF rates of 45% and 55% are considered quite unfair.77 
When statutes set caps for CF rates, their disregard for other variables—the 
sum claimed, probability of success, and scope of work—is even more striking. 
Notions of division fairness are not the only explanation for this prevailing 
tendency. The considerable costs of more precise regulation, tailored to fit the 
specific characteristics of every case, are certainly pertinent as well.78 Also, to 
the extent that high CF rates are characteristic of frivolous suits, capping CF 
rates may inhibit such suits.79 We nevertheless believe the prevailing notions of 
fairness play a central role in this context. 
Arguably, when statutes use sliding scales—that is, a set maximal CF rate 
for awards up to a certain amount of recovery, a lower maximal rate for any 
additional sum up to another point, and a lower maximal rate for sums 
recovered beyond this higher point—they indirectly take into account the 
attorney’s working hours. The marginal effort needed for recovering any 
additional sum beyond some minimal award is probably decreasing.80 Thus, 
sliding scales of this type better approximate the fairness of exchange (or input 
fairness). 
Interestingly, statutory sliding scales in the United States do not ordinarily 
use another proxy for the attorney’s input, namely, the stage at which the suit 
terminates—whether the case is settled without filing a suit, requires filing a 
lawsuit, goes to trial, or even reaches an appeal. In this respect, there is a 
striking difference between the statutory sliding scales and the variable-
percentage CF used by lawyers. The former reduces the attorney’s share the 
larger the recovered sum while ignoring the stage at which it was recovered; the 
latter increases the attorney’s share the more stages are required to recover the 
award and disregards the amount recovered. While both formulas seem 
superior to a flat CF rate, the one used by lawyers plausibly better 
approximates the lawyer’s input and, thus, the fairness of exchange. So, why do 
regulators opt for the sliding scale formula? 
 
 76. Thus, in Experiment 4, the difference between the unfairness ratings of 45% and 55% (0.89 on 
a scale of 1 to 9) was smaller than the difference between the unfairness ratings of 30% and 40% in 
Experiment 3 (1.26 on the same scale). Plausibly, the perceived unfairness depends also on the ratio 
between the values compared (1:1.33 in Experiment 3; 1:1.22 in Experiment 4) and it gradually 
increases as the CF rate increases. 
 77. The findings are also compatible with the empirical findings concerning the determination of 
fees by courts in class actions. While courts take into account such factors as reasonable hourly rates 
and scope of work, there is “an overwhelming correlation between class recovery and attorney fees . . . 
.” Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical 
Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 72 (2004). 
 78. Schneyer, supra note 4, at 395–402, 410–11 (arguing that ex post review of the reasonableness 
of CF arrangements faces great practical difficulties, while “fee caps are inherently overbroad and 
underbroad”). 
 79. Dwyer, supra note 3, at 622–29. 
 80. Id. at 625. 
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One explanation is that regulators concerned with the “litigation explosion” 
want to remove any incentive for attorneys to file suits (or appeal judgments). 
Rather, they wish to encourage out-of-court settlements that ease the burden on 
the courts.81 Another explanation rests on defendants’ lobbying. Presumably, 
insurance companies and health providers are not particularly interested in 
ensuring fair remuneration for lawyers. Instead, they have a clear interest in 
diluting attorneys’ incentives to recover very high sums from defendants.82 
Finally, it stands to reason that legislators, similar to the respondents in our 
experiments, view the issue as one of division fairness, and so are less concerned 
about the fairness of exchange. 
To sum up, our findings do not provide a conclusive answer to the question 
of how fairness judgments affect the prevalent CF rates. However, they support 
the proposition that these judgments primarily influence the market through 
attorneys’ choices and regulators’ decisions, rather than through the 
preferences of clients. 
On the normative level, there are several justifications for ensuring the 
fairness of remuneration. Arguably, a legal regime guaranteeing such fairness is 
just because it is the type of regime that rational, risk-averse people would have 
chosen behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.83 From an efficiency standpoint, 
invalidation of unfair contracts may assist parties in reaching an agreement by 
deterring them from taking extreme positions in negotiation. Such invalidation 
also saves parties the need to take inefficient precautions against the risk of 
unfair bargains.84 Ensuring contractual fairness may also be justified on grounds 
of market failure,85 as well as on distributive and paternalistic grounds.86 While 
these justifications are all contestable, one thing seems quite clear. These are all 
possible justifications for ensuring contractual fairness of exchange, not division 
fairness. Inasmuch as judicial and statutory supervision of attorneys’ contingent 
 
 81. See Brickman, supra note 4, at 1349; Dwyer, supra note 3, at 626 (explaining that contingency 
fee limitations will increase the take-home pay for clientsincentivizing them to accept settlements and 
decrease the attorney’s stake in litigation, making them more amenable to settlement as well). 
 82. Dwyer, supra note 3, at 625 (discussing the chilling effect of sliding scales on handling cases 
with high expected damages). See also Garber et al., supra note 3 (assessing the impact of damages that 
caps possess on lawyers’ willingness to handle cases). 
 83. Hugh Collins, Distributive Justice Through Contracts, 45(2) CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 49, 54 
(1992). 
 84. F.H. Buckley, Three Theories of Substantive Fairness, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 33, 37–59 
(elaborating on these efficiency arguments). 
 85. Unfair contractual arrangements often result from flawed contracting processes or market 
failures, such as information problems and exploitation of monopoly power. See ATIYAH, supra note 
34, at 333–34 (discussing the interrelations between substantive and procedural fairness). 
 86. Unfair allocation of the proceeds of a transaction may result from initial unequal distribution of 
power and wealth, and may perpetuate and even broaden such inequality. See, e.g., Equality in 
Exchange, supra note 34, at 1588–90. As for paternalism, once it is realized that people’s decisions do 
not always serve their best interest due to various cognitive biases, at least in some cases of 
misjudgment, it may be justified to protect people from extremely unfair contracts. Cf. Zamir, supra 
note 34, at 1780, 1785–88 (examining paternalistic justifications for mildly regulating contracts’ 
content). 
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fees rests on fairness considerations, the intuitive tendency to focus on division 
fairness is hardly defensible. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
The findings of the experiments presented in this article shed new light on 
the perceptions of fairness informing the ongoing debate about attorneys’ 
contingent fees, as well as on the ways people are likely to form such judgments 
in comparable contexts. CF arrangements strongly invoke notions of division 
fairness that tend to overshadow notions of fairness of exchange. Thus, high CF 
rates are deemed unfair even when they result in rather low effective hourly 
rates, and vice versa. These perceptions likely animate the public and legal 
debate on CF arrangements, which in turn may directly (by imposing a fairness 
constraint on pricing) and indirectly (by inducing actual or threatened 
regulation) drive high CF rates out of the market. Notions of fairness may thus 
explain why high CF rates are rare even in cases in which they would have 
clearly served the interests of both parties. Our findings also provide additional 
explanation—though hardly a justification—for the basic patterns of judicial 
review and legislative regulation of CF arrangements, which very often place 
great emphasis on the percentage of the contingent fee while ignoring other 
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APPENDIX 
 
Table A1: Cases Employed in Experiment 187 
Case Award Prob. EV %CF ENV ECF Hours EHR 
1 100,000 .65 65,000 20 52,000 13,000 100 130 
2 100,000 .65 65,000 55 29,250 35,750 100 357.5 
3 100,000 .90 90,000 20 72,000 18,000 100 180 
4 100,000 .90 90,000 55 40,500 49,500 100 495 
5 500,000 .65 325,000 20 260,000 65,000 100 650 
6 500,000 .65 325,000 55 146,250 178,750 100 1,787.5 
7 500,000 .90 450,000 20 360,000 90,000 100 900 
8 500,000 .90 450,000 55 202,500 247,500 100 2,475 
  
Table A2: Cases Employed in Experiment 3 
Case Award Prob. EV %CF ENV ECF Hours EHR 
1 100,000 .65 65,000 30 45,500 19,500 100 195 
2 100,000 .65 65,000 40 39,000 26,000 100 260 
3 100,000 .90 90,000 30 63,000 27,000 100 270 
4 100,000 .90 90,000 40 54,000 36,000 100 360 
5 500,000 .65 325,000 30 227,500 97,500 100 975 
6 500,000 .65 325,000 40 195,000 130,000 100 1,300 
7 500,000 .90 450,000 30 315,000 135,000 100 1,350 
8 500,000 .90 450,000 40 270,000 180,000 100 1,800 
 
Table A3: Cases Employed in Experiment 4 
Case Award Prob. EV %CF ENV ECF Hours EHR 
1 100,000 .65 65,000 45 35,750 29,250 100 292.5 
2 100,000 .65 65,000 55 29,250 35,750 100 357.5 
3 100,000 .90 90,000 45 49,500 40,500 100 405 
4 100,000 .90 90,000 55 40,500 49,500 100 495 
5 500,000 .65 325,000 45 178,750 146,250 100 1,462.5 
6 500,000 .65 325,000 55 146,250 178,750 100 1,787.5 
7 500,000 .90 450,000 45 247,500 202,500 100 2,025 





 87. In this table and the following ones, EV denotes the expected value of the claim (the sum 
claimed multiplied by the probability of obtaining it); ENV is the expected net value of the claim (EV 
minus ECF, the expected contingent fee); and EHR is the expected effective hourly fee (ECF divided 
by the number of hours the attorney is expected to spend on the case). 
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Table A4: Cases Employed in Experiment 5 
Case Award Prob. EV %CF ENV ECF Hours EHR 
1 100,000 .80 80,000 20 64,000 16,000 100 160 
2 100,000 .80 80,000 40 48,000 32,000 100 320 
3 100,000 .80 80,000 20 64,000 16,000 40 400 
4 100,000 .80 80,000 40 48,000 32,000 40 800 
5 500,000 .80 400,000 20 320,000 80,000 100 800 
6 500,000 .80 400,000 40 240,000 160,000 100 1,600 
7 500,000 .80 400,000 20 320,000 80,000 40 2,000 
8 500,000 .80 400,000 40 240,000 160,000 40 4,000 
 
Table A5: Cases Employed in Experiment 6 
 
Case Award Prob. %CF EV ECF FF 
1 50,000 .65 20 32,500 6,500 2,600 
2 50,000 .65 55 32,500 17,875 7,150 
3 50,000 .90 20 45,000 9,000 3,600 
4 50,000 .90 55 45,000 24,750 9,900 
5 250,000 .65 20 162,500 32,500 13,000 
6 250,000 .65 55 162,500 89,375 35,750 
7 250,000 .90 20 225,00 45,000 18,000 
8 250,000 .90 55 225,000 123,750 49,500 
